The continual growth of network traffic rates leads to heavy packet processing overheads, and a typical solution is to partition traffic into multiple network processors for parallel processing especially in emerging software-defined networks. This paper is thus motivated to propose a robust dynamic network traffic partitioning scheme to defend against malicious attacks. After introducing the conceptual framework of dynamic network traffic partitioning based on flow tables, we strengthen its TCP connection management by building a halfopen connection separation mechanism to isolate false connections in the initial connection table (ICT). Then, the lookup performance of the ICT table is reinforced by applying counting bloom filters to cope with malicious behaviors such as SYN flooding attacks. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our proposed traffic partitioning scheme with real network traffic traces and simulated malicious traffic by experiments. Experimental results indicate that our proposed scheme outperforms the conventional ones in terms of packet distribution performance especially robustness against malicious attacks.
nection management is strengthened by isolating false connections to make them much easier to control. As a further step, the management of false connections 60 is reinforced to mitigate the destructive effects of malicious attacks especially on the lookup performance of TCP connection tables. Next, we give the algorithmic implementation of our dynamic traffic partitioning scheme based on packet classification in terms of TCP connection tables. Finally, the packet distribution performance of our scheme is evaluated by carrying out experiments with real 65 network traffic traces and simulated malicious traffic.
With the above methodology, we aim to achieve the following conclusions as the main contributions of this paper: (a) giving the conceptual framework of dynamic traffic partitioning scheme based on flow tables to guarantee flow granularity and achieve real-time traffic load balance; (b) strengthening TCP 70 connection management by building a half-connection connection separation mechanism to isolate false TCP connections in the initial connection table (IC-T); (c) reinforcing the lookup performance of the ICT table by applying counting bloom filters to defend against malicious behaviors such as SYN flooding attacks. 75 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work. In Section 3, we describe the conceptual framework of dynamic network traffic partitioning based flow tables, and promote its packet distribution performance by building the half-open connection separation and employing counting bloom filters to resist malicious attacks. Section 4 gives the algorith-80 mic implementation and complexity analysis of our proposed dynamic network traffic partitioning scheme. In Section 5, we evaluate the packet distribution performance of our proposed scheme with real network traffic traces. Section 6 concludes the paper. 85 In the last decade, there have been many literatures on traffic load balancing in various network applications. Most of their work focused on the load balanc-ing capacity of network traffic partitioning, but rarely contributed to the packet distribution performance, especially robustness against malicious behaviors.
Related Work
Cao et al. [16] designed a table-based hashing scheme for the scenario of sev-90 eral network processors with different capacities in Internet traffic load balancing. The scheme splits a traffic stream into multiple bins mapped into outgoing links based on an allocation table. However, the algorithm has poor adaptability of load balance, and it has been pointed out that hashing alone is not able to balance network traffic workload [20] . Lai et al. [17] proposed a traffic 95 partitioning algorithm for parallel intrusion detection systems. They employed hash table to maintain simultaneous TCP connections, and partitioned network traffic in virtue of TCP connection state. The algorithm provides better load balancing capacity than direct hashing schemes. However, it does not consider TCP state accurately, and ruins the integrity of connection context during 100 packet scheduling.
Chen et al. [18] presented a session-oriented adaptive load balancing algorithm based on IP header multi-field classification. The algorithm dynamically adjusts flow bundles to guarantee session integrity when traffic load becomes imbalanced between processing units. To keep dynamic balance between pro-105 cessing units, they remapped the flow bundle with the least number of TCP flows to the lightest loaded processing unit. Sun et al. [19] provided a novel load balancing algorithm for parallel intrusion detection systems. The algorithm maps each incoming packet by hashing its key header fields to an interval allocated for an IDS sensor. The interval is fine-tuned in terms of processing ca-110 pacity and current load of all IDS sensors to achieve real-time balance of traffic distribution. However, these algorithms will produce frequent flow adjustment because of bursty network traffic, which leads to a lot of load migration between the sensors.
Targeting load balancing between forwarding engines in Internet routers, 115 Shi et al. [20] classified Internet flows into two categories: the aggressive and the normal, and applied dynamic scheduling policies to the aggressive flows to achieve both load balancing and efficient system resource utilization. Kencl et al. [21] presented an adaptive load balancing scheme for load sharing among multiple network processors within a router. They designed a feedback control 120 mechanism to prevent processor overload, and provided an adaptive extension of the highest random weight (HRW) scheme to cope with biased traffic patterns.
The scheme achieves significant improvement in processor utilization, and minimizes the probability of flow reordering by exploiting the minimal disruption property of the adjustment of the packet-to-processor mapping. 125 Li et al. [22] proposed an application-based dynamic-least-load-first algorithm for high-speed network intrusion detection systems. They real-timely maintained a hash table of all assigned sessions and dynamically scheduled new sessions in terms of current load levels of all intrusion analyzers. Jiang et al. [23] [24] discussed a flow-based dynamic traffic partitioning algorithm for intru-130 sion detection systems in high-speed networks. The algorithm divides packet stream with flow granularity and forwards a packet of a new session to the detection engine with the least load currently. Xiong et al. [25] dynamically maintains a hash table of concurrent sessions, and assigns a session to a network processor with the lightest load level when the session appears. These algorithms achieve 135 good effect of traffic load balancing, but their packet distribution performance is not adequately considered.
For the above motivations, this paper proposes a robust dynamic network traffic partitioning scheme. In this scheme, we strengthen its TCP connection management by building the half-open connection separation mechanism 140 to isolate false TCP connections in the ICT table and reinforce the lookup performance of the ICT table by employing counting bloom filters to defend against SYN flooding attacks. By this way, we strive to boost the packet distribution performance of dynamic traffic partitioning scheme especially in the presence of malicious attacks.
Dynamic Traffic Partitioning Scheme
This section describes the conceptual framework of dynamic traffic partitioning based on flow tables, and optimizes its TCP connection management by building the half-open connection separation mechanism and employing counting bloom filters for robustness against malicious attacks. 
Conceptual Framework
Many network applications relating to stateful packet processing usually employ load balancing technologies to deal with massive packet traffic. One of their key problems is traffic partitioning scheme. The traffic partitioning scheme in stateful packet processing usually needs to satisfy the following properties [12] : Dynamic traffic partitioning at the micro level is to distribute each incoming packet to a network processor. As seen from the above fundamental principle, an essential operation of packet distribution is the flow heads rise sharply. Note that all false connections induced by such attacks will not complete three-way handshake to establish a TCP connection. In virtue of this feature, we build the half-open connection separation (HCS) mechanism to isolate false connections from normal connections. The essential concept of the HCS mechanism is to separate initial connections including all false connection-s from the TCP connection table and manipulate them separately. As for its implementation level, we run two TCP connection tables: (a) the initial connection table (ICT), whose connections have been initiated but not yet completed the three-way handshake; (b) the established connection table (ECT), whose connections have been established.
230
According to the above scheme, we illustrate the lifetime of a TCP connection within our connection management in Fig.2 . When a new connection appears, its record will be generated into the ICT table. Once the connection is established, the record will be immediately transferred to the ECT table.
When the connection is terminated, we will delete the record from the ECT 235 The above HCS mechanism results in two controllable TCP connection tables, i.e., the ICT In summary, the HCS mechanism divides a oversize TCP connection table into 255 two size-controllable tables, and makes malicious attacks much easier to resist.
Counting Bloom Filters
When malicious attacks occur, the ICT A bloom filter [34] is a simple space-efficient data structure for representing a set in order to support membership queries. A counting bloom filter [35] generalizes a bloom filter data structure so as to allow that the set can be changing dynamically via insertions and deletions. Fig.3 illustrates the working 270 principle of the ICT table employing a counting bloom filter. It is described by an array A of m counters (with several bits), initialized to 0. And It uses k independent hash functions h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h k , each with range {1, · · · , m}. It has a set C of n elements c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c n , i.e., connection identifiers in the ICT table. If an element c is to be inserted into the set C, the counters the element c is in the set C, although there is a certain probability that we are wrong. This is called a "false positive". In such case, we still need to search the ICT table for an exact result. The probability for a false positive error is dependent on the parameters k, 285 m/n. For the counting bloom filter, after n connections were inserted at random into the counter array of size m, the probability that a particular counter is 0 is
Hence the probability of a false positive in this situation is [35] [36]
(
The right-hand expression in (1) is minimized for k = ln2 * m/n, in which 290 case the error rate is (1/2) k = (0.6185) m/n . For example, the false positive error rate is slightly larger than 2.15%, when m/n = 8, k = 6. The false positive error rate is only 0.314%, when m/n = 12, k = 8.
For the counting bloom filter, it is also important to know how large the memory of the counters can become. In order to determine a good counter size, 295 we consider this situation: after inserting n connections with k hash functions into a counter array of size m, the probability that the j th counter is greater or
As mentioned above, we can optimize the false positive rate with k = ln2 * m/n, so we assume that we restrict ourselves to k = ln2 * m/n, then
If we set 4 bits per counter, the counter will overflow if and only if some counter reaches the value 16. From the above, we know that 
Algorithmic Implementation and Analysis
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This section describes the algorithmic implementation of our dynamic traffic partitioning scheme called DTP-CBF based on TCP packet classification, and analyzes its algorithmic complexity in terms of average search length.
TCP Packet Classification
Dynamic traffic partitioning at the micro level is packet distribution per- There is no doubt for a non-TCP packet since we maintain a respective flow 3) Packets with RST flag. A packet with RST flag is sent whenever a segment arrives which apparently is not intended for the current connection. The 335 packet is generated in 3 typical cases [37] : (a) a connection request is delivered to a non-existent port. This situation happens at the beginning of connection establishment, and its connection must reside in the ICT phase, and its connection must be maintained in the ECT table.
Algorithmic Description
Upon receiving a packet, we first parse it to get its key fields with respect to protocol header format at each layer, and calculate its flow identifier with its source/destination IP addresses and port numbers defined below. With the above assumptions, the ECT table is supposed to hold the load factor close to α, since the established connections dominate TCP connections under normal conditions. As seen form the algorithmic description, we only need to search the ECT table for all normal packets except three-way handshakes.
420
Therefore, it is reckoned that a normal packet approximately takes the search length in (5) on average to find its connection. 
As for attack packets typically falsified SYN ones, we do not need to search any flow table if the counting bloom filter succeeds to predict their failed lookups.
In such case, it is supposed to take the search length 1 as the price of computing 425 hashes for each packet. Otherwise, we should continue to search through the ICT table probably in failure. With the same hash table length of the ECT   table, the ICT table is considered to keep the load factor υωα. So an attack packet will take the search length υωα + 1 for unsuccessful prediction of its lookup result. With the false positive error rate p, it can summarized that we 430 need to take the average search length in (6) for attack packets.
In summary, we can calculate the average search length of our proposed scheme in (7) with (5) and (6) .
As for conventional dynamic traffic partitioning schemes that maintain all simultaneous flows of each protocol above IP header in a single hash table, we need to match (α+υωα)/2+1 times on average in the TCP connection table for normal packets and take the average search length α + υωα to go through the table for malicious packets. Consequently, we can compute the average search length of the conventional schemes in (8) .
Subsequently, we can deduce the packet distribution performance speedup 440 of our proposed scheme DTP-CBF compared to the conventional one DTP-SHT in (9) with (7) and (8).
As in (9), the false positive error rate p is supposed as no more than 0.1 by setting the number of hash functions as k = 6 and the ratio between the size of the counter array to the number of initial connections as m/n = 8. The load 445 factor α is expected to take approximately 1, if the hash table length of the   TCP connection table is configured closely to the number of TCP connections under normal conditions. The average number of packets within a connection ω is measured to fall around 16 for most of the time. Then, the speedup in (9) can be simplified in (10).
450 Speedup = 16υ 2 + 9υ + 1.5 1.6υ 2 + υ + 1.5 .
As seen from (10), the speedup chiefly depends on the ratio between the number of malicious packets and that of normal ones υ which reflects the intensity of malicious attacks. For example, the speedup will be respectively 4.17, 6.46 and 8.43, if υ=1/2, 1 and 2. In conclusion, the average search length of our proposed scheme will be much shorter than that of the conventional ones.
Experiments
This section evaluates the packet distribution performance of our proposed traffic partitioning scheme DTP-CBF especially under malicious attacks with real network traffic traces. Table. 4. 
Traffic Trace Properties
Packet Distribution Performance
With the above traffic traces, we contrast our proposed dynamic traffic partitioning scheme DTP-CBF with the conventional one in terms of packet dis- 
Experiment 1 (Normal Conditions)
We first evaluate the packet distribution performance of both dynamic traffic TCP traffic in our selected traces. In particular, falsified packets are mixed with normal packets in different proportions to reflect diverse attack intensity.
As for the counting bloom filter, the number of its counters is configured in terms of m = nklog 2 e, where the number of initial connections n, i.e. the size 510 of the ICT table, is closely related to the attack intensity. The ICT table is dominated by unexpired false connections in the presence of malicious attacks, and its size depends on the timeout interval of each initial connection, the number of normal packets per second, and the hybrid ratio of falsified packets and normal packets. The timeout interval is generally adjusted to 1 second once 515 SYN flooding attacks occur [32] [33] . The number of normal packets per second is around 128K in each traffic trace illustrated in Table. 4. Besides, the number of hash functions k is fixed as 6. In summary, the number of counters m can be configured as 1M times as the packet hybrid ratio.
In our experiments, falsified SYN packets are inserted into TCP traffic in 520 the 4 selected traces respectively during the 20th-30th second, 30th-50th second, 30th-50th second and 35th-65th second. Then we operate both dynamic traffic partitioning schemes on mixed traffic respectively with the packet hybrid ratio 1:2, 1:1 and 2:1, and calculate their average search length in Fig.6, Fig.7 and Fig.8 .
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As seen from Fig.6, Fig.7 and Fig.8 , our proposed scheme DTP-CBF performs packet distribution with much shorter average search length than the conventional one DTP-SHT. In particular, the DTP-CBF scheme always takes steady short search lengths no matter how fierce the attacks are. In contrast, the DTP-SHT scheme degrades sharply in the presence of SYN flooding attack-530 s. In conclusion, our proposed scheme provides much better robustness against SYN flooding attacks than the conventional one. This is attributed to the fact that all falsified SYN packets no longer need to search any flow tables as a result of the application of the counting bloom filter. 
Conclusion and Future Work
535
Dynamic traffic partitioning schemes have been widely applied in high-speed network packet processing, which achieve excellent load balance effect at the price of heavy packet distribution overheads. This paper proposes a robust dynamic traffic partitioning scheme against malicious attacks, which builds the half-open connection separation mechanism to isolate false TCP connections in 540 the ICT table, and applies counting bloom filters to the ICT table to defend against SYN flooding attacks. The experimental evaluations indicate that our proposed scheme performs much better than the conventional ones in terms of packet distribution performance. In particular, our proposed scheme perform packet distribution with the average search length steadily at about 1 even in 545 the presence of SYN flooding attacks.
In our future work, more traffic traces from different high-speed network lines will be utilized to evaluate and validate our dynamic traffic partitioning scheme. After that, we plan to deploy it in specific network applications such as content delivery. Furthermore, applications of our proposed scheme to the 550 environment of future networks, such as software defined networks, is also within our future work plan.
